Work incentives are closely related to production performance. This paper presents evidence that the value added of a fi rm increases when relative labour wage rises, or the level of unemployment increases. Both circumstances imply evidence in favour of the effi ciency wage model. This theory is consistent with the views of many managers and personal administrators, who tend to ascribe primary importance to wage setting as an incentive to increase eff ort. We use a micro panel data set of Spanish manufacturing fi rms for the period 2004-2009 to simultaneously estimate a stochastic frontier of a fi rm's value added and the ineffi ciency determinants. The data source is published in the Spanish Industrial Survey on Business Strategies (Encuesta sobre Estrategias Empresariales, ESEE) collected by the Fundación SEPI.
Introduction
The greatest problem faced by the Spanish economy is the high level of unemployment. During the period of economic growth that lasted from 1995 to 2007 the Spanish economy created a large number of jobs, only for them to be destroyed as easily as they had been created when the fi nancial crisis began. During the 1999-2007 period, employment increased by 38.5%. If we compare the evolution of employment in Spain with respect to other countries of the European Union (Eurostat, 1999 (Eurostat, -2007 , Spain far exceeded the European average increases in total employment in non-agricultural sectors. Spain was one of the countries of the European Union where employment grew more in the construction sector. Only the three Baltic Republics and Ireland had better results in job creation in this sector than Spain.
The impact of the crisis on employment was observed in Spain in late 2007. In fact, in the third quarter of 2007, Spain reached the highest level of historical occupation, so this was the turning point in the economic cycle. The fall in employment was very intense and concentrated mainly in autumn-winter [2008] [2009] . Although most fall in 2008 occurred in the construction sector (31%), industry and services also suffered severe job losses (Garcia-Serrano, 2011) . Unemployment augmented uncontrollably reaching 18% in 2009 and it is currently close to 26% of the active population. This dramatic increase in unemployment is due fundamentally to the destruction of a large number of jobs with scarce value added, which was refl ected in the low levels of productivity of the Spanish economy. The persistence of a high level of involuntary unemployment contradicts the traditional microeconomic analysis of this type of situation. Why does the high level of competence among the unemployed not provoke a reduction in salaries suffi cient to cause a drop in unemployment? There are many reasons why the labour market cannot function as a competitive market. We shall explain those that are, in our opinion, the most relevant. The social dimension of salaries makes it diffi cult for them to carry out the equalising role with respect to supply and demand that conventional economic theory attributes to prices in the market place. The existence of ethical norms in the labour market that condition the actions of the agents operating within it, impedes purely optimizing behaviour. Time plays a far more important part in the function of the labour market than is recognised by the basic, extemporal model of supply and demand. Furthermore, what is exchanged in the labour market is not the "work" that will be used in the production process, but rather the "inclination to work". The conversion of this capacity into work effectively carried out is a problem that businessperson face daily, as an integral and inseparable part of the production process. This is evidenced by both the habitual systems of incentives and bonuses that businesses use and by the need to supervise, in one way or another, the work done. While this is self-evident to social observers, it has a perturbing effect on the competitive model of the labour market.
The objective of this paper is to provide empirical evidence in favour of the effi ciency wages theories. We provide evidence to suggest that above average wage increases the productivity of workers and therefore their effi ciency. In this sense, higher relative wages are able to attract a better group of workers within the industrial sector. Labour costs (gross wage) include not only the salaries paid to workers, but also social security payments and payments in kind, among other forms of retribution. Therefore, a systematic policy of reducing labour costs may lead to a poorer selection of workers for the fi rm, that is, in the same way that the price of a product refl ects its quality, the salary of workers ought to refl ect the quality of work. It is important to distinguish between labour costs per worker and labour costs per unit of production, because what is relevant here is what fi rms are able to produce by paying these labour costs. The introduction of new technologies and managerial decisions regarding the innovation of production processes and products are extremely important in order to guarantee a high level of competiveness and effi ciency in the long term. The Spanish model of production that has been based fundamentally on construction and speculation distorted the system of business incentives that aim to achieve a greater level of technical and economic effi ciency. Now there is a hurried attempt to regain competiveness by reducing labour costs, without any apparent awareness that these measures may damage our level of effi ciency in the medium and long term.
The rise in unemployment during the period 2007-2009 has produced an increase in the technical effi ciency of businesses. This result, together with that mentioned in the preceding paragraph, is coherent with the existing models of effi ciency wage. The enormous level of unemployment that the Spanish economy is experiencing has meant that a high percentage of the population is in a situation of social exclusion. The fear of being forced into this group undoubtedly raises the costs of redundancy for workers, and they are obliged to increase their efforts at work and to accept negative changes in their circumstances, such as a decrease in redundancy payments and a reduction in their salary negotiating power. However, some fi rms are unwilling to decrease wages because a reduction in salaries negatively affects production. The models of effi ciency wages are able to explain this relationship between salaries and the effectiveness of work. A high level of unemployment increases the effectiveness of work as the worker increases his/her effort because he/she is aware of his/her reduced probability of fi nding new employment if fi red from his/her present job for lack of effort (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984) . In the sociological model posited by Akerlof (1982) fi rms are able to augment the efforts of their workers by paying them a salary higher than the average market salary, but with the implicit condition that the workers will reciprocate by working harder than the minimum effort required by their employees. Industry and occupation variables were found to be relatively important explanatory variables for variation in earnings. Murphy and Topel (1987) also used longitudinal data, and produced different results from those obtained by using cross-section data. Wadhwani and Wall (1991) using UK fi nancial data show that fi rms that increase their real wage improve their productivity. Levine (1992) fi nds that a business unit that raises the relative wages for their workers has productivity increases approximately large enough to pay for the wage rises as found in the United States and Japan. In Sánchez et al. (1995) it is shown that those Spanish fi rms paying above the average also obtain a level of productivity above average; also Sánchez (1997) obtained empirical evidence that sector productivity level growths when either relative wage or the level of unemployment increases. Sánchez and Toharía (2000) provided evidence on the testable implications of effi ciency wages, productivity and the composition of the labour force for Spain.
Martín-Marcos and Suárez-Gálvez (2000) analysed the existence of technical ineffi ciency of production in the Spanish manufacturing sector. Others focused on particular determinants of effi ciency; for instance, Delgado et al. (2002) centred on the relation between effi ciency and exports, while Díaz and Sánchez (2004) examined the link between technical effi ciency and the makeup of the labour force and, also, in (2008) focused on the performance of small and medium-sized manufacturing fi rms in relation to technical ineffi ciency and its determinants. With other econometric techniques, Fariñas and Ruano (2004) analysed the contribution of continuing fi rms and turnover to total factor productivity; Huergo and Jamandreu (2004) measured the probability of introducing innovations in manufacturing fi rms at different stages of their existence. All of them used the ESEE data set of Spanish manufacturing fi rms.
The novelty that our work incorporates is that it estimates the effect of a higher relative labour cost per worker, on fi rms' value added through a stochastic frontier panel data model. Here we obtain empirical evidence that a higher relative cost improves productivity in Spanish manufacturing fi rms. We also test the differences in effi ciency between the years of estimation differentiating between the expansionary period 2004-2007 and the recessive period 2008-2009. We fi nd out that the rise in unemployment suffered after 2007 from reduced technical ineffi ciency and it is evidence in favour of the shirking model of effi ciency wages. The Shirking model demonstrated that an increase in the cost of job loss stimulates productivity. Our paper also differs from previous literature in Spain, because we use an improved frontier model and we calculate the real impact of the coeffi cient of technical ineffi ciency through the method of Wan (2002).
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 introduces the econometric method of estimation. In Section 3 we describe the sample and the data. In Section 4 we present the results of the estimated frontier and the ineffi ciency determinants. Finally in Section 5 we summarise the main conclusion.
Stochastic Frontier and the Ineffi ciency Model
An implicit assumption of production functions is that all fi rms are producing in a technically effi cient manner, and the representative (average) fi rm therefore defi nes the frontier. Variations from the frontier are thus assumed to be random, and are likely to be associated with mis-or unmeasured production factors. In contrast, estimation of the production frontier assumes that the boundary of the production function is defi ned by "best practice" fi rms. It therefore indicates the maximum potential output for a given set of inputs along a ray from the origin point. Some white noise is accommodated, since the estimation procedures are stochastic, but an additional one-sided error represents any other reason fi rms would be away from (within) the boundary. Observations within the frontier are deemed "ineffi cient", so from an estimated production frontier it is possible to measure the relative effi ciency of certain groups or a set of practices from the relationship between observed production and some ideal or potential production (Greene, 1997) .
We use the SFA (Stochastic Frontier Approach) to estimate a production frontier with ineffi ciency effects. Explicitly, we use a panel data version of the Aigner et al. (1977) approach following Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) , and Wang (2002) specifi cation, in which technical ineffi ciency is estimated from the stochastic frontier and simultaneously explained by a set of variables representative of the fi rms' characteristics. This approach avoids the inconsistency problems of the two-stage approach used in previous empirical works when analysing the ineffi ciency determinants.
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The model can be expressed as:
Where i indicates fi rms and t represents the period, X is the set of inputs; β is the set of parameters, v it is a two-sided term representing the random error, assumed to be iid N(0,σ v 2 ); u i is a non-negative random variable representing the ineffi ciency, which is assumed to be distributed independently and obtained by truncation at zero of N(μ it ,σ u 2 ). The mean of this distribution is assumed to be a function of a set of explanatory variables:
Given that technical effi ciency is the ratio of observed production over the maximum technical output obtainable for a fi rm (when there is no ineffi ciency), the effi ciency index (TE) of fi rm i in year t could be written as:
In a two-stage procedure, fi rst of all a stochastic frontier production function is estimated and the ineffi ciency scores are obtained under the assumption of independently and identically distributed ineffi ciency effects. But in the second step, ineffi ciency effects are assumed to be a function of some fi rm-specifi c variables, which contradicts the assumption of identically distributed ineffi ciency effects.
2 Individual effi ciency scores u i, which are unobservable, can be predicted by the mean or the mode of the conditional distribution of u i given the value of (v i -u i ) using the technique suggested by Jondrow et al. (1982) .
The effi ciency scores obtained from expression (3) takes value one when the fi rm is effi cient, and less than one otherwise. The function coeffi cients (β) and the ineffi ciency model parameters (δ) were estimated using a panel data technique to control for unobserved heterogeneity.
The estimates of the ineffi ciency effects model only indicate the direction of the effects over ineffi ciency levels. We calculated the marginal effects to show how a change in an exogenous variable affects ineffi ciency. Following Wang (2002), we obtained the marginal effects by taking the derivatives of the unconditional mean of the effi ciency predictor with respect to each of the ineffi ciency effects variables (Z M ) 3 :
Where δ M are the coeffi cients of the ineffi ciency model, Φ( . ) and ϕ( . ) are the probability and cumulative density functions of a standard normal distribution respectively, and Λ is:
Data and Variables
The data source is published in the Spanish Industrial Survey on Business Strategies (Encuesta sobre Estrategias Empresariales, ESEE). The data is collected by the Fundacion SEPI and sponsored by the Spanish Ministry of Industry. This is supplied as a panel of fi rms' representative of twenty industrial sectors. A distinctive feature of the data is that companies contributing in the survey were chosen according to a careful selection structure. The sample of fi rms includes almost all Spanish manufacturing fi rms with more than two hundred employees. Firms employing between ten and two hundred employees were chosen according to a stratifi ed random sample representative of the population of small fi rms. Given the procedure used to select fi rms participating in the survey, both samples of small and large fi rms can be considered as samples that allow us to estimate the distribution of any of the characteristics of the population of Spanish manufacturing fi rms with information available from our data set. Each year a number of additional fi rms were selected according to a random sampling procedure among the whole population of fi rms. This selection is conducted using the same proportion as in the original sample (see Fariñas and Jaumandreu (2004) for technical details of the sample). From the original sample, a number of fi rms have been eliminated, most of them due to a lack of relevant data. Others were eliminated because they reported a valueadded annual growth rate per worker in excess of 500% (in absolute value), and some were rejected because they have fewer than ten workers and, in both cases, they would distort the analysis. Also, we do not include fi rms after a merger or division process in our sample data. Our sample includes 2,247 fi rms from the ESEE Survey and refers to an unbalanced panel where we have eliminated those fi rms for which we do not have two consecutive years of data. Our period of analysis runs from 2004 to 2009. Summary statistics of the data are presented in Table 2 . We estimate a stochastic translog production function adding a term of ineffi ciency, whose mean is the function of a set of ineffi ciency determinants. 
The variables used for estimation of the production frontier are the value-added, such as the output variable, and the number of employees in the fi rm, capital stock and trend, as input variables (X it ), the industrial sector dummies (S i ). In Appendix we present a more precise defi nition of the variables used for estimation and the defi nition of the ineffi ciency determinants considered.
Analysis of the Results
From the frontier approach, we obtain a measure of a fi rm's technical ineffi ciency compared with the best observations of the sample. The value of the estimates allows us to explain the differences in the ineffi ciency effects among fi rms. As technological and market conditions can vary over sectors, we have included sector dummy variables in the production function in order to be able to control them.
The maximum-likelihood estimates of the production frontier parameters, defi ned in Equation 6, given the specifi cation for the ineffi ciency effects, defi ned in Equation 7, are presented in Table 3 . We use the translog specifi cation for the production function and we obtain the expected signs of the inputs estimates.
In this section we present three estimates of the stochastic frontier of production with three alternative ineffi ciency models. These three estimates all include size variables and the fi rst two include relative labour costs (RW), while the third estimate uses instead the labour costs per unit of production. In the fi rst two cases we have analysed the effect of relative salaries on ineffi ciency, while in the third case we have measured effectiveness in terms of production, in which importance is given not only to the retributions received 4 We imposed the usual symmetry conditions to the translog function.
( 7) by the workers, but also to the processes of production employed by fi rms and their organization with regard to their production processes. In the fi rst case the effect of the economic cycle is measured throughout the years in the sample, and takes as a point of reference the year 2008, which is the year in which unemployment began to rise, moving from 8.3% in 2007 to 11% in 2008; in the second and third cases we have constructed a fi ctional variable to account for take into account the impact of 2008 and 2009.
The results obtained in Table 3 demonstrate that higher relative labour costs reduce the level of ineffi ciency in fi rms. This is made apparent by the coeffi cients in this variable, as in both estimates they are negative and signifi cant. These greater relative costs per worker act as a proxy for the quality of labour. Therefore those fi rms that are willing to pay more within the same sector reduce the problems caused by an adverse selection of the workforce generated by a poor remuneration policy, avoid the problems occasioned by a continually changing workforce and motivate their staff to make more effort. When we calculate the marginal effects of this variable in Table 4 , we fi nd that the impact results in an 8% reduction of ineffi ciency in estimate (1) and close to a 7% reduction in estimate (2). In the same sector of industry fi rms that seek to attract the highest qualifi ed workers in the market place and obtain a higher rate of productivity per worker by means of a policy of paying high salaries and providing good working conditions coexist with fi rms that use a policy of low salaries to increase their rates of productivity per worker. The use of one policy or another will depend to a great extent on the characteristics of the company.
Other previous works for Spain estimate the impact of relative wages on productivity through Dynamic Panel Data, and in the same panel of data of the production function, so it has to use instrumental variable for the causality problem that such estimation could generate. The basic framework of a standard effi ciency wage model starts assuming wages affect worker's effi ciency. In the implementation of this hypothesis worker effi ciency is assumed to be labour augmenting, and enters in the production function as an additional input. For Spain, Sánchez, Urbano and Ortí (1995) provide empirical evidence about this hypothesis. They show that some industries are willing to pay higher wages than their competitors in order to have higher levels of productivity per worker. Also, in Sánchez (1997) it is obtained evidence in favour of the effi ciency wage hypothesis, using the Dynamic Panel Data (DPD) model due to Arellano and Bond (1988) the simultaneity bias between productivity and wage is controlled by using a standard instrumental variable estimator provided by the DPD econometric programme. Sánchez and Toharia (2000) tests this hypothesis for Spain assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function. With the same data source, ESEE (1990 ESEE ( -1994 , they estimate a Dynamic Panel Data (DPD) model due to Arellano and Bond (1988) and obtain that the effect of the variables included on the effort function on productivity is non-trivial. In fact, they obtain a value of 0.41 of the elasticity of effort with respect to the fi rm's own wage 5 . Also they quantify the elasticity of effort with respect the average wage of the industry and it is -0.53. Each time the average wage of the industry rises, the average level of effort of the fi rm diminishes, thus, hierarchy of wages seems to be more important than the own wage.
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In the ESEE it is used the average labour cost as a measure of the wage of the fi rm. Additionally in this work we estimate the impact of unit labour cost on effi ciency. The coeffi cient of unit labour costs (ULC) is positive and signifi cant, which indicates, as it should, that higher labour costs per unit of product widen the difference with the frontier of effi cient production. The marginal value of the coeffi cient is 1.4, which shows that its impact is far greater than any other factor included in the ineffi ciency model. This is without doubt the key point. What is important here are not the labour costs in themselves but what the fi rm is able to achieve with these costs in terms of production. Therefore, the objective should be not simply to reduce labour costs but to change the model of production by incorporating more effi cient uses of technology and by training the workforce.
The size of fi rms is another important factor to be considered when analysing the effi ciency of fi rms. In Spain most fi rms are small or medium-sized businesses. In our sample fi rms that had more than 500 employees made up only 9.45% of the total. The coeffi cients, of the three sizes of fi rm analysed, where positive and signifi cant with respect to large fi rms. This result suggests that the smaller a business is, the further it is likely to be from the frontier formed by the most effi cient fi rms in the sample. In Table  3 the marginal effect is greater the smaller the size of the fi rm in question. Therefore we may conclude that if Spanish businesses increase their average size they will reduce their distance from the stochastic frontier. This result may be partially explained by the fact that large businesses invest much more in research and development than medium and smalled-sized businesses. Firms with more than 500 workers are those that receive the highest percentage for innovation in the process of production (54.60%) and in the product (43.01%), (Díaz and Sánchez, 2013) .
In fact, the economic analysis of OECD for Spain 2014 showed that investment in R&D remains low, suggesting that is not effective. The government should reduce volatility of their total fi nancial support to R&D: Innovation is a long-term investment, so that the stability of funding is crucial. Apart from scholarships, loans and tax incentives, the authorities should continue to promote and expand the use of other instruments such as venture capital. Despite the current restrictions, the government should continue to promote the stability of R&D.
Concluding Remarks
In the context of globalization the current policy of indiscriminate salary reduction that is being carried out in Spain is affecting productivity and will continue to do so in the long term. In this paper we have obtained evidence of the impact of relative labour costs on the effi ciency of businesses, fi nding that those fi rms which pay higher than average salaries in their sector reduce ineffi ciency. What is relevant here are not the labour costs of the businesses themselves but rather what fi rms may obtain by paying these costs. What is pertinent are the costs per unit of production, which are determined by labour costs, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, by the technology employed, the organizational structure of fi rms and the ability of managers to organize effi ciently the factors involved in production.
A policy such as the one pursued in Spain that is based on the systematic worsening of labour conditions without fi rms making any changes in their model of production in the middle or long term will result in qualifi ed workers leaving the country, and that will in turn impact negatively on productivity. The Spanish economy will fi nance the training of young workers who have no real prospects of employment in Spain, either because there will be no jobs that correspond to their level of training or because the remuneration offered for those jobs available will be excessively low compared to other countries in the European Union and beyond.
The key point for Spanish fi rms is to increase their investment in research and development (R&D) to obtain higher levels of productivity and effi ciency. A higher level of R&D will reduce the unit labour cost and improve competitiveness in a better way than a systematic reduction of labour cost. SEC3: Chemical products; cork and plastic; non-metallic mineral products. SEC4: Basic metal products; manufactured metal products; industrial equipment. SEC5: Offi ce machinery and others; electrical materials. SEC6: Cars and engines; other material transport. SEC7: Other manufactured products.
Determinants of effi ciency:
ULC: Total fi rm' labour cost over their level of production RW: The ratio of fi rms labour cost by worker over average labour cost by worker for industrial sector. 
Time:
There are six dummy variables that take value one when the fi rm belongs to the corresponding year; otherwise this value is zero. The category of reference is 2008.
Size:
-SIZE 1: Firms with no more than 100 workers. -SIZE 2: from 101 up to 200. -SIZE 3: from 201 up to 500. -SIZE 4: Firms with a number of workers higher than 500. Category of reference.
